This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of. The broader literature on counterinsurgency warfare and provides recommendations to help the United States. 4 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, trans. (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 'Modern warfare' for Trinquier is subversive or revolutionary warfare, making a changed situation in which 'Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions - political, economy, psychological, military - that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.' 11 Galula captures these lessons in his seminal work, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2006). Another French authority on COIN, Roger Trinquier, describes the French. Counterinsurgency experience in his book, Modern Warfare. He refers to “modern warfare” as an asymmetric.

1. Modern Warfare

This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era reveals how French officers who served in Indochina, like the author, Roger Trinquier, fought fierce rear-guard actions against ideologically motivated insurgents in the 1940s and 1950s to a far greater extent than their American counterparts later faced in Vietnam. The lac This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era reveals how French officers who served in Indochina, like the author, Roger Trinquier, fought fierce rear-guard actions against ideologically motivated insurgents in the 1940s and 1950s to a far greater extent than their American counterparts later faced in Vietnam. The lack of coherent strategic direction from Paris in the chaotic years of the Fourth Republic left the military with the task of making political decisions in the field. With the original introduction by Bernard B. Fall and a new foreword prepared by Eliot A. I'll freely confess to being an armchair warrior, but this is one of the best books I've read on counter-insurgency: clear, detailed, exciting in parts, and with no jargon.

Tinquier has unassailable experience, as the commander of a 20,000 strong Montagnard army in French Indochina, and then later some of the most effective French airborne forces in Algeria. True, France lost both those wars, but defeats are profound learning experiences. Trinquier explains how insurgencies develop from a small p I'll freely confess to being an armchair warrior, but this is one of the best books I've read on counter-insurgency: clear, detailed, exciting in parts, and with no jargon. Tinquier has unassailable experience, as the commander of a 20,000 strong Montagnard army in French Indochina, and then later some of the most effective French airborne forces in Algeria. True, France lost both those wars, but defeats are profound learning experiences.

Trinquier explains how insurgencies develop from a small political-military core into mass movements capable of bringing down governments, how they aim to outlast their conventional foes, and how they can be defeated. He argues that the guerrillas are the most expendable part of the organization, and that defeating them is irrelevant. The logistical core of the movement is the true target, and finding it requires building a complete civilian intelligence service, that links everybody to their house and social position (household, hamlet, village, district, etc), and then to a system that gathers human intelligence and funnels it to the military police. As a first step, Trinquier suggests locating and arresting the rebel tax collectors, since they must have contact with the population and are inevitably unpopular. Then, the enemy network can be tracked, located, and rolled up. His attitude is brutally realistic.

Fans of a 'clean wars' will be disturbed by his advocacy of torture ('The terrorist expects to be tortured in the same way the infantryman expects to be machine-gunned, or the aviator shot at by flak.' To paraphrase), and the use of scorched earth tactics against insurgent base areas. On the other hand, he also puts protection of the population at the center of the strategy, and makes legitimate government a cornerstone of a successful campaign. Absolutely vital for anybody interested in guerrilla warfare.

A fascinating read from someone who has experienced “modern warfare.” He does a great job of clearly laying out the problem and his proposed solution. Anyone interested in counterinsurgency must read it. I’m not steeped in this literature so I don’t know if there are others who precede him who put it this succinctly or whether this is groundbreaking in its clarity. His basic premise is simple enough. Traditional warfare of set battles between uniformed armies is less likely and “modern warfare” o A fascinating read from someone who has experienced “modern warfare.” He does a great job of clearly laying out the problem and his proposed solution. Anyone interested in counterinsurgency must read it. I’m not steeped in this literature so I don’t know if there are others who precede him who put it this succinctly or whether this is groundbreaking in its clarity.

His basic premise is simple enough. Traditional warfare of set battles between uniformed armies is less likely and “modern warfare” of insurgents without uniforms or masses of troops to face other masses of troops is the new norm. Instead of destroying the enemy forces for victory, winning is defined politically through the use of “all methods” to influence the populace, including terrorism. If modern armies don’t adapt, then they will lose, as he sees the French did in Viet Nam and were doing in Algeria.

His solutions of how to recognize the enemy, organize friendly forces and territory, and methods to defeat the adversary are all worth reading and can be seen to have influenced counter-insurgency ever since (including U.S. Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan).

BUT (and you were waiting for this I can tell) he makes several false assumptions and ultimately is discussing modern warfare at the tactical-operational level and not the strategic. First he tries to distinguish among regular soldiers, partisans, and terrorists/guerrillas.

He believes the way that terrorists/guerrillas operate, torture (or “enhanced interrogation techniques”) can be used on them; that it is a risk they undertake as part of their war of non-uniformed, hit-and-run tactics. For some reason, obtaining information by torture from soldiers and partisans is not useful. He never explains why but there is no inherently logical reason that obtaining information from a terrorist is useful but not the other two types of combatants. The adversary would clearly like to know from captured soldiers and partisans of plans, capabilities, etc. Why not use torture there?

Why does he distinguish it for terrorists only? He has other problems when it comes to torture, such as assuming that the skilled interrogators will find that one precise piece of information they want and halt the torture. Has that been the historical case? This critique is a detail, however.

His fundamental problem is that the modern warfare he has experienced is not an internal problem within a European nation subverted by alien ideas or forces but in areas where the Europeans are occupiers. Yes, his example of Algeria, for him, fits the bill. The French considered Algeria part of France, like we view Hawaii. But in reality the French occupied Algeria and it was a colony. The basic problem he has is that the European army using these methods in a foreign country is almost always seen as an occupier by some portion of the populace.

The better example is the urban terrorist groups that plagued Europe in the 1970s and 1980s (Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany, Red Brigades in Italy). These were indigenous (although there is some evidence of outside assistance) movements in these countries. The Germans were not occupying the land of the Baader-Meinhof gang, so the legitimacy of the struggle against them was higher; the real support of the population was more significant. The French in Algeria and Vietnam were occupiers and not legitimate. For him to say that all measures must be employed to combat this enemy because of their opposition to the nation and their illegitimacy and his army’s legitimacy does not take into account the sweep of nationalism and anti-colonialism that gave rise to these insurgent movements. He assumes a unity between the government, the army, and the populace that is not there when it comes to a colonial relationship – regardless of how he views it.

While the tactical and operational approach he takes may make sense based on certain conditions, the areas he talks about using them in will find them ultimately failing if the army using these is an occupation force and not the national army that represents/reflects the nation. This book has modest fame as one of the first on how to fight an insurgency.

It is clearly written with a readily understood program, and it is quite wrongheaded. It makes absolutely no mention of the fact that insurgencies are sustained by legitimate grievances in the population, that (as other writers have said) insurgencies are primarily a political problem, not a military one. It should be noted that the author had extensive experience in fighting insurgencies, in Indochina and in Algeria-in This book has modest fame as one of the first on how to fight an insurgency. It is clearly written with a readily understood program, and it is quite wrongheaded. It makes absolutely no mention of the fact that insurgencies are sustained by legitimate grievances in the population, that (as other writers have said) insurgencies are primarily a political problem, not a military one. It should be noted that the author had extensive experience in fighting insurgencies, in Indochina and in Algeria-in both of which the insurgents won, despite some tactical and even operational victories by the French. In Trinquier's program, the army moves into a city suffering an insurgency and makes a strict census, issues identity cards, establishes a curfew, establishes a hierarchy of civilian leaders down to the block level, and interrogates all of them privately.

In a few months this will give the army a good idea of who the lowest-level insurgent agents are. Then in one night, the army descends on these enemies, gets information on their higher-ups by any means necessary, and rounds them up the same night. Any dissent from this program is treated as treason.

This is no lieutenant's war-it is thoroughly planned at the theater level. In this way, the insurgency is wiped out in short order, you see.

In that city, at that moment. It should be noted that this worked in Algiers, though a little later the French lost Algeria. We are not to worry about the implications for freedom of the extensive and pervasive network of informers-it is only necessary during the actual insurgency-but it also needs to be created ahead of the insurgency, so that things never get out of hand-Tranquier never squares that circle.

In one place the insurgents are said to readily give information because they have been coerced into service, and in another they are said to be ideologically committed. No explanation there either. Torture to quickly get military information from captives (and for no other purpose, it should be noted) is a moral necessity. There is no guidance on how to tell true from false information, or how to avoid having citizens use false denunciations to settle private scores. In the countryside, things are a little different. The usual outposts, patrols, ambushes, sweeps, and so forth are all useless. The rural areas are to be cleared of insurgents and left 'absolutely uninhabitable' (p.

Galula and Trinquier on Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (from a longer paper for Bruce Hoffman's SEST-520 Counterinsurgency class) David Galula and Roger Trinquier: both French officers, both warriors through the Second World War, the French Indochinese War, and the Algerian War for Independence. In 1964, each wrote a manual on the lessons he had learned about the new form of war fought in the last two of these conflicts. Called “revolutionary warfare” by Galula and “modern warfare” by Trinquier, Galula and Trinquier on Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (from a longer paper for Bruce Hoffman's SEST-520 Counterinsurgency class) David Galula and Roger Trinquier: both French officers, both warriors through the Second World War, the French Indochinese War, and the Algerian War for Independence.

In 1964, each wrote a manual on the lessons he had learned about the new form of war fought in the last two of these conflicts. Called “revolutionary warfare” by Galula and “modern warfare” by Trinquier, it spanned the spectrum from a Maoist-inspired, mostly rural insurgency in Indochina, to a mixed urban and rural insurgency in Algeria. Each author strived to abstract his experience in order to transform the conventional military and the political establishment and to meet the demands of counterinsurgency warfare and to achieve victory.

While the two mostly agreed on definitions and implications, they began to diverge on the question of strategy and tactics. Trinquier tends to focus on the tactical and operational level, and although he acknowledges the importance of politics in counterinsurgency, he tends to address military issues.

Galula examines larger strategic issues, and describes both military and political actions that are necessary for a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Yet whatever their differences, both have effective advice for the counterinsurgent, and both of the books should be used in conjunction when planning and preparing for counterinsurgency operations. Trinquire's counterinsurgency classic draws from his experiences with the French in Algeria and Indochina.

Modern Warfare

He discusses at length the manner in which the counterinsurgency campaign is a competition for goverance and legitimacy, however he seems to overpredict the effectiveness of brute force. Even though he acknowledges the limitations of large-scale sweep-and-clear operations, he still recommends them as the central weapon of the counterinsurgent, while minimizing the effects of capacity-buildi Trinquire's counterinsurgency classic draws from his experiences with the French in Algeria and Indochina. He discusses at length the manner in which the counterinsurgency campaign is a competition for goverance and legitimacy, however he seems to overpredict the effectiveness of brute force. Even though he acknowledges the limitations of large-scale sweep-and-clear operations, he still recommends them as the central weapon of the counterinsurgent, while minimizing the effects of capacity-building and infrastruictural development of local institutions. Although he discusses effective intelligence gathering strategies in the indigenous population, he quite surprisingly over-predicts the effectiveness of torture (saying it should be used against all or most terrorists) while ignoring its inefficiency and negative side effects in propaganda campaigns.

Although a classic, it is easy to see how many of Trinquire's reccomendations are out of doubt in the context of a modern counterinsurgency campaign involving advanced media and systems of communication. Trinquier analyzes insurgency as a modern form of warfare while acknowledging that many of the tactics for insurgency have existed for centuries. Trinquier argues that globalization has increased the tactical capability of ancient insurgent techniques and then sets about describing the way that a state can successfully wage a counterinsurgency. His work is realistic and concrete, but his methods are hard to envision in an age of even more media bias and increased connectivity. Certainly, in Amer Trinquier analyzes insurgency as a modern form of warfare while acknowledging that many of the tactics for insurgency have existed for centuries. Trinquier argues that globalization has increased the tactical capability of ancient insurgent techniques and then sets about describing the way that a state can successfully wage a counterinsurgency.

His work is realistic and concrete, but his methods are hard to envision in an age of even more media bias and increased connectivity. Certainly, in America, Trinquier's call for techniques which would temporarily suspend civic rights and individual freedom would be unacceptable - he would respond that such a failing would be to the detriment and probable demise of the government faced with such an insurgency. Of particular interest are his views on the terrorist as a psuedo-soldier and the baptism of torture which the terrorist must endure in order to be treated as a lawful combatant. Interesting - but not sure I agree. A manual on counterinsurgency by a right-wing French officer, lucky enough to have left the French army by the time of the attempted 1961 Algerian putsch (otherwise he may well have participated and seen the inside of a French jail).

He went off to serve as a mercenary in the Congo instead. The edition I read was published by the US Army Command and General Staff College, and is frequently cited in books about contemporary counterinsurgency warfare, in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Most controversi A manual on counterinsurgency by a right-wing French officer, lucky enough to have left the French army by the time of the attempted 1961 Algerian putsch (otherwise he may well have participated and seen the inside of a French jail). He went off to serve as a mercenary in the Congo instead.

The edition I read was published by the US Army Command and General Staff College, and is frequently cited in books about contemporary counterinsurgency warfare, in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Most controversially, the author justifies torture as one of the hazards that guerrillas take upon themselves by engaging in unconnventional warfare. He does make valuable observations about French counterinsurgency practice in Algeria and Indochina, but David Galula's book is superior in reducing counterinsurgency to a set of actionable concepts. A historically significant work on the practice of counter revolutionary war, noteworthy for the author's naive assumption that the most common basis of mass support for resistance is 'terrorism' by a conspiratorial and manipulative revolutionary elite. This attitude which is to an extent necessitated by his class position, leads to seriously erroneous assumptions about the sustainability of insurgencies with no 'organic' social base (see his absurd speculations about how unspecified 'subversives A historically significant work on the practice of counter revolutionary war, noteworthy for the author's naive assumption that the most common basis of mass support for resistance is 'terrorism' by a conspiratorial and manipulative revolutionary elite. This attitude which is to an extent necessitated by his class position, leads to seriously erroneous assumptions about the sustainability of insurgencies with no 'organic' social base (see his absurd speculations about how unspecified 'subversives' could transform France into Algeria through random acts of violence alone). One can assume a similar elitist conception has guided the vanguard violence of fascist insurgencies like the Italian New Order.

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(February 2013) Roger Trinquier Born 20 March 1908 ( 1908-03-20), France Died 11 January 1986 ( 1986-01-12) (aged 77), France Allegiance France Service/ branch Years of service 1931–61 Rank Commands held Battles/wars Awards Commander of the Other work, Author Roger Trinquier (20 March 1908 – 11 January 1986) was a officer during, the and the, serving mainly in and units. He was also a theorist, mainly with his book Modern Warfare. Retrieved on 16 November 2008. Edward Behr The Algerian Problem,. Archived from the original on April 13, 2008. Retrieved 2008-02-11. CS1 maint: BOT: original-url status unknown.

Retrieved on 11 February 2008. Retrieved on 12 February 2008. Further reading General Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955–1957.

(New York: Enigma Books, 2010). Centro Studi Strategici Carlo De Cristoforis(CESTUDEC), Roger Trinquier,La guerra moderna in una prospettiva francese,a cura di Gagliano Giuseppe.(Italy,2011) Robert R Tomes, Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare, Parameters Spring 2004 External links. (French).